In this paper, we analyze the growth of these two countries using the relatively new neoclassical depression methodology, which is based upon the standard neoclassical growth model.
Our results suggest that movements in total factor productivity (TFP) can largely explain the poor growth performance in New Zealand and Switzerland. Our growth accounting attributes almost the entire decline in output to changes in TFP and a relatively insignificant amount to changes in labor and capital inputs. We calibrate a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to the two countries and find that a model in which TFP is exogenous can explain about 96 percent of the decline in output for New
Zealand and more than 100 percent of the decline for Switzerland.
In New Zealand, TFP grew on trend until it fell rapidly between 1974 and 1980, then leveled out, and now seems to be growing on a lower trend path. This observation is important in terms of the previous work on New Zealand's productivity. New Zealand underwent one of the most radical and complete set of market reforms in the late 1980s, including labor market reform, foreign trade liberalization, privatization of publicly owned enterprises, and tax reform. 2 The importance of these reforms has focused much of the research on productivity in New Zealand to the period immediately before and after the implementation of the reforms. This line of research has been successful in evaluating the reforms and their effects and has provided valuable insight for policy makers. Our results suggest, however, that the economy of the 1970s and early 1980s needs to be more closely studied to understand the current situation.
1 This specific comparison is based on the GDP per adult equivalent series in the Penn World Tables. Switzerland's GDP per adult equivalent, expressed in Penn World Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, and Teece (1996) for a survey of the reforms and their initial outcomes.
Total factor productivity -as a residual after taking the impact of changes in capital and labor inputs out of changes in real output -includes the effects of a country's institutions, such as taxes, openness to foreign competition, and legal system.
Changes in institutions can change the growth path of TFP. The identification of these changes seems to be the key to understanding aggregate growth in New Zealand. A frequently cited candidate for the cause of New Zealand's poor performance is the decline of its terms of trade. (See, for example, Rose 1985 and Easton 1997, chap. 5 .)
The beginning of the great depression in New Zealand coincides with its loss of favored access to markets in its major trade partner due to the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). Data show a subsequent sharp fall in the terms of trade and large changes in New Zealand's trade patterns. The resulting disruption in production patterns is a promising candidate for the drop in TFP growth rates.
In Switzerland, TFP fell steadily compared to trend from 1973 to 1996, and this fall explains most of Switzerland's great depression. TFP and GDP grew at their respective trend rates following 1996, but do not appear to be returning to their previous trend paths. As in New Zealand, that TFP explains almost everything leaves us needing to explain TFP. In particular, we are left looking for the changing institutional factors that are reflected in our measurement of TFP. Switzerland's institutions include highly protected domestically oriented sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, construction, and information technology. These sheltered sectors have had declining labor productivity, while the sectors exposed to competition have seen improvements.
These facts are especially relevant considering Switzerland's failure to join the European Union, a move that would have forced many of these protected sectors to face international competition and European Union-mandated deregulation. Switzerland did begin a series of reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness in these sectors as part of its revitalization plan, however. These reforms began to be implemented in the late 1990s and seem to coincide with the increased GDP and TFP growth rates found in the same period.
The next two sections outline the neoclassical depression methodology and its implementation. First we present the results of our growth accounting, and then we show how a calibrated growth model can reproduce the observed changes in output. We go on to discuss possible reasons for the decline in TFP for each country and suggests possible directions for future research on determining the causes of the modern great depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland.
Neoclassical Depression Methodology
Studying depressions using the neoclassical growth model is a relatively new methodology. Cole and Ohanian (1999) first applied the growth model to study the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States. This successful application led to the study of depressions around the world using this method, including the depressions in Argentina (Kydland and Zarazaga 2002) , Canada (Amaral and MacGee 2002) , Chile and Mexico (Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto 2002) , France (Beaudry and Portier 2002) ,
Germany (Fisher and Hornstein 2002) , Italy (Perri and Quadrini 2002) , Japan (Hayashi and Prescott 2002) , and the United Kingdom (Cole and Ohanian 2002) . For more details on the methodology, as well as an extensive collection of applications, see Kehoe and Prescott (2003) .
We study a country's economic growth by measuring its real GDP per workingage person relative to a trend. We concentrate on GDP per working-age person instead of the more common per capita measure since it is consistent with our theoretical economy in which the entire working-age population is capable of working. Because of the availability of data, we choose to count those aged 15-64 as the working-age population and, thus, most likely to be available for work. (We compare GDP per working-age person and GDP per capita in Appendix B.) We work with a Cobb-Douglas specification of the aggregate technology:
where t Y is GDP in year t , t K is the capital stock, t L is hours worked, and t A is TFP.
When TFP grows at a constant rate (that is, when TFP is
), the neoclassical growth model implies a unique balanced growth path in which output and capital per worker grow at the same constant rate, 1 g − . It is relative to this trend growth rate that we measure a country's performance. Kehoe and Prescott (2002) argue that this trend growth in TFP represents the world stock of useable production knowledge growing smoothly over time and that this knowledge is not country-specific. We define the trend growth rate to be 2 percent per year, corresponding to the growth rate of GDP per working-age person for the United States over the period 1920-2000. Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider the United States to be the best choice because it is a large, relatively stable country and because it is the current industrial leader. As shown in Figure 1 , the 2 percent trend in GDP per workingage person fits the U.S. data very well, with the only major deviations from trend being the Great Depression, 1929 -1939 , and the World War II buildup, 1939 -1946 The stock of world production knowledge is common across countries, but countries differ in their institutional structures. This implies that, even though all countries on a balanced growth path grow at the same rate, each country is on its own growth path. These paths differ in their levels of output per working-age person.
Countries with institutions that encourage efficiency grow on a path with higher output per working-age person than countries with institutions that encourage rent seeking or other activities that lower efficiency. The institutions that determine these paths include competition policy, bankruptcy systems, and the legal system. The parts of these institutions that affect neither labor input nor the accumulation of capital are captured in TFP. Changing institutions changes the path of TFP, moving a country to a new balanced growth path. One of the central premises of the neoclassical depression methodology is that explaining movements in TFP involves identifying the changing institutions. Depression" (Hawke 1985) . This episode was marked by a sharp drop below trend, followed by a quick recovery. In contrast, the recent great depression has been slower to develop, but GDP per working-age person has deviated more from trend, and for a much longer period. In Switzerland, we see a different pattern. The decline in the cross-sectional ranking is another indicator of these two countries' poor growth.
Great Depression or Slow Growth?
Some might object to our use of the term "great depression" to describe the Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider two characteristics important in defining a great depression. First, the deviation of output per working-age person from trend must be large, and second, the deviation from trend must occur quickly. Using the methodology outlined in the previous section, they define a period of economic growth below trend as a great depression if it meets the following three conditions:
1. There is no significant recovery during the period in the sense that there is no subperiod of a decade or longer in which the growth of output per working age person returns to rates of 2 percent or better.
2. There is at least one year in which output per working-age person is at least 20 percent below trend.
3. There is at least one year in the first decade of the great depression in which output per working-age person is at least 15 percent below trend. that the current depression in Japan is milder than were the first decades of the depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland. Japan's importance in the world economy, however, has attracted attention to its situation. 
Growth Accounting
To evaluate the contributions of various factors to the changes in output per working-age person, we set up an accounting framework based on the neoclassical growth model. For a more detailed discussion of the foundations and motivation for the particular functional forms and a thorough analysis, see Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and .
As explained earlier, we model aggregate production using the Cobb-Douglas form. Since we are concerned with growth in output per working-age person relative to a balanced growth path, it is useful to write the production function in terms of output per working-age person and measures of factor inputs that are constant along a balanced growth path:
where t Y is output, t K is capital, t L is labor, t N is working-age population, and t A is TFP. TFP is calculated as the residual after accounting for capital and labor:
To compute the t A series for New Zealand and Switzerland, we compile data on output, labor, and investment from each country's national accounts. Labor is measured as total hours worked. We construct t L by multiplying the country's average yearly employment by the average number of hours worked per week. Using investment data, we generate the series of capital stocks using
where t X is investment (measured as changes in inventories and gross fixed capital formation) and δ is the depreciation rate. Given a value for δ , we choose the initial capital stock so that the capital-output ratio is the same in 1954 as its average over the period [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] . We set 0.056
, which implies that capital consumption as a fraction of output,
, is 0.167 for Switzerland in 1970, the same as the capital consumption allowance as a share of GDP that is reported in the Swiss national accounts.
For New Zealand, this value of δ implies a capital consumption ratio of 0.146 in 1970, while in the data it is 0.090. A value of δ less than 0.03 is needed to match the capital consumption ratio for New Zealand. We choose to use 0.056 since the lower value of δ seems implausibly small compared to the values for comparable countries.
We still need to choose a value for capital's share of income, α . Unfortunately, neither New Zealand nor Switzerland publishes data detailed enough to compute labor and capital shares as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) or in Gollin (2002) . These methods require, at a minimum, information on the operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises. When we compute the crude labor share of income ( )
that does not account for the self-employed, we find values that imply α around 0.44 and 0.34 for New Zealand and Switzerland, respectively. 4 Gollin (2002) shows that factor shares adjusted for self-employment income and sectoral composition are remarkably constant across both time and countries, however, and that the capital shares cluster around 0.30.
Given the evidence presented in Gollin (2002) and our crude calculation of factor shares, we choose to set capital's share of income,α , to 0.300 for both countries. 5 Results of numerical experiments not reported here show that our qualitative conclusions are not very sensitive to the values that we have chosen for α and δ .
Using the series for labor, output, and the constructed capital stocks, we compute TFP for each of the countries. In the balanced growth path, hours worked per workingage person are constant, and output and capital both grow at the same constant rate. It is then easy to see from (2) that in a balanced growth path in which output per working-age person grows at 2 percent per year, the TFP component of output, To quantify the contributions of the TFP component and other factors in the growth of these two economies, we use our theoretical framework to guide our growth accounting. As in Hayashi and Prescott (2002) , we can take logarithms of the production function (1) and rearrange terms to relate output per working-age person, hours worked per working-age person, the TFP component, and the capital-output ratio:
( ) 1 log log log log . 1 1
This expression can be used to decompose the average annual growth rate of output per working-age person over a number of years, s , into (
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The above expression decomposes changes in output per working-age person into changes in the TFP component (the first term on the right-hand side), changes in the capital-output ratio (the second term on the right-hand side), and changes in hours worked per working-age person (the last term on the right-hand side). Along the balanced growth path, both hours per worker and the capital-output ratio are constant, so we would expect these terms in (6) to be very small in our growth accounting if the economy is on the balanced growth path.
We present the results of this decomposition for New Zealand in the first column of The growth accounting confirms our intuition gained from the plots of the TFP component and output. Output growth in New Zealand and Switzerland seems to be largely accounted for by changes in the TFP component. The contributions of labor and capital are not trivial, however, particularly the contributions of labor in New Zealand. In the next section we construct a model to explore the extent to which exogenous productivity changes can account for the findings of this section.
Baseline Model
We calibrate a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to see how much of the change in output we can account for using only productivity changes. In this model agents live in a closed economy and have perfect foresight over the sequence of productivity. The model features a representative agent who maximizes the utility function ( ) ( ) ( )
subject to a sequence of budget constraints,
and has an initial stock of capital, 1970 K . The total number of hours available for work is t hN , where t N is the working-age population and h is the number of hours available for market work per week. We choose h to be 100. To be consistent with our growth accounting, the production technology in the economy is of the Cobb-Douglas form, implying the following feasibility constraint:
The utility function's parameters β and γ must be calibrated before solving the model. From the producer's problem, we have the standard expressions for wages and capital rental rates,
1 ,
which allows us to use the consumer's first-order conditions to compute β and γ as ( ) It should be pointed out that the real investment series used to calculate the capital stock in (4) and to calibrate the discount factor β using the consumption-investment trade-off in (11) is formed by deflating nominal investment by the GDP deflator rather than by the investment deflator. This decision makes a lot of sense when we are thinking in terms of the labor leisure trade-off (11). It makes less sense when we are thinking in terms of capital accumulation (4). An alternative formulation worth exploring would replace the feasibility condition (9) with
Here t q is the price of the investment good, measured as the ratio of the invest deflator to a deflator for the rest of GDP. In this framework some of technological progress shows up in increases in TFP and some in a fall in the relative price of investment.
Given the values for the parameters, the initial capital stock, and series for t N and In the second columns of Table 1 and Table 2 we display the results of our growth accounting on the model's labor, capital, and output series. A comparison of the first and second columns in Table 1 
Explaining TFP
Our growth accounting makes it clear that understanding the economic performance of New Zealand and Switzerland requires an understanding of TFP. In attempting to account for cross-country levels of income per capita, Prescott (1998) concludes that only TFP, and not the accumulation of capital or the labor input, can account for these differences. Thus, to explain both the cross-country distribution of per capita income and the large movements of GDP within a specific country, we need to be able to explain TFP. Prescott (1998) calls for a theory of TFP and suggests that a candidate theory might involve a country's resistance to the adoption of more efficient technologies. This theory is further developed in Parente and Prescott (2002) , in which monopoly rights to work practices are considered as an institution that slows the adoption of new technologies.
While there is no broadly accepted theory of TFP, a country's institutions likely play a large role in the evolution of its TFP. Institutions that may be important include a country's openness to foreign competition, the existence of monopoly rights, the prevalence of labor unions, government regulation of industry, and price controls, among others. In this section we discuss some of the institutions in New Zealand and Switzerland that are worth investigating. In particular, we are searching for changes in the institutional structure in these countries that took place around the beginning of their depressions and have persisted throughout the period. Temporary "shocks" will not be able to account for the prolonged depressions, since neither of these countries has recovered to its trend TFP and output levels.
New Zealand
Given New Zealand's poor economic performance after 1974, it should come as no surprise that other researchers have studied the determinants of economic growth there. Hall (1996) does aggregate growth accounting for New Zealand based on detailed sectoral calculations by Philpott (1993 Philpott ( , 1994 (Lattimore and Wooding 1996) . These changes were partially in response to the more drastic changes in policy being undertaken in the United Kingdom.
In 1968, the EEC implemented a customs union that eliminated duties between member countries, and imposed a common external tariff. where New Zealand still enjoyed some privilege, exporters now had to compete with subsidized U.K. farmers (Hawke and Lattimore 1999) .
Evidence of the impact of these barriers is visible in Figure 13 and Figure 14 . The changes in the terms of trade and the changes in New Zealand's relationships with its trade partners -and the resulting disruption in trade patterns -undoubtedly had a major impact on the New Zealand economy. The results of our numerical experiments in the previous section indicate that, to assign significant blame to these external shocks as a cause of New Zealand's great depression, we need to be able to construct a model in which the impact of these shocks show up in measured TFP. An obvious direction to take in modeling the impact of changes in the terms of trade and trade policy would be to model imported goods as intermediates in production as done by Amaral and MacGee (2002) and Perri and Quadrini (2002) . A sharp drop in the terms of trade and/or an increase in trade barriers can lead to a large decrease in consumption and investment. As stressed by Kohli (2000) , however, this sort of shock will have a much smaller effect on real GDP because imports are deflated by an import price deflator and then subtracted from consumption, investment, government spending, and exports to form real GDP. Consequently, the simple approach that has trade shocks affecting production by making foreign inputs more expensive cannot account for a large drop in TFP because it has little effect on measured GDP unless labor and capital inputs change.
An alternative approach would be to model the frictions involved in moving labor and capital between the sectors that produce exportable goods and nontradable goods into the sector that produce importable goods as in Kehoe and Fernandez de Cordoba (2000) .
A challenge to any theory of New Zealand's great depression based on trade shocks is the observation that the return of the terms of trade to higher levels and the trade liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s has not, at least so far, resulted in a return of New Zealand to its pre 1974 balanced growth path.
Switzerland
None of Switzerland's falling TFP can be explained by changes in the terms of trade. As shown in Figure 15 , Switzerland's terms of trade have been steadily increasing over the last 30 years. Switzerland's trade patterns have stayed relatively constant over the last 30 years, indicating that there was probably not any large change in trade relations. Given the lack of evidence that Switzerland's external trade has changed drastically, we turn our attention to two other possible explanations.
Structural Rigidities
Hviding ( An analysis of the productivity of these two sectors would allow us to carefully evaluate this potential explanation for Switzerland's poor aggregate productivity growth.
Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain detailed data by industry, particularly data on capital, for Switzerland. Faced with this constraint, Hviding (1998) assigns manufacturing to the open sector and the nonmanufacturing private sector to the sheltered sector. Given this dichotomy, Hviding looks to labor productivity for evidence of slow productivity growth. Over the period 1965-1975, the Swiss manufacturing sector's labor productivity grew at an average annual rate of 2.75 percent. In this same period, the nonmanufacturing sector's labor productivity grew at 2.5 percent per year on average. In the period 1976-1996, manufacturing productivity continued its growth, averaging 2.5 percent per year on average. Nonmanufacturing productivity growth fell to only 0.5 percent per year during the period 1976-1996, however.
The combination of structural rigidities and sector-specific technological change appears to be a plausible explanation for Switzerland's poor productivity growth. This preliminary evidence suggests that a detailed analysis of the structure of Swiss industry might yield important insights into Switzerland's great depression.
Foreign Labor
A second possible explanation for Switzerland's poor productivity growth may be the structure of its work force. Since the early 1970s there has been an increasing stock of permanent foreign workers in Switzerland. These workers tend to be low skilled, and, between 1977 and 2000, they have more than doubled their share in unemployment. If new technology and high-skilled workers are complements, then access to a large pool of low-skilled workers may hinder the new technology's adoption.
Sheldon (2000) finds that technological change in Switzerland is skill biased and that the increasing number of low-skilled, permanent foreign workers is slowing technological change. Switzerland's foreign worker policy allows three kinds of temporary foreign work permits and a permanent permit that entitles the holder to the same rights as national workers. In particular, permanent permit holders may continue to live in Switzerland even when they are not employed. Since the 1960s, the fraction of foreign workers under permanent permits has increased steadily, more than doubling from 1970 to 2000. Sheldon (2001) reports that the share of permanent and annual workers in the total workforce has remained relatively constant at about 18 percent, but that the share of these workers in unemployment has increased from about 20 percent of unemployment in 1977 to more than 45 percent in 1999.
Sheldon (2000) estimates a trans-log production function for Switzerland, using a panel of 21 industries and 5 types of labor input. The panel data allow Sheldon to classify the foreign workers by their permit type. The estimations imply that Switzerland's technological change is factor saving with regard to most types of foreign workers. Sheldon (2001) couples this finding with the rising number of available lowskilled workers and suggests that firms may be substituting low-wage workers for new technologies.
The lack of productivity growth in the sheltered sector could certainly be related to the foreign worker situation. The protected sector in Switzerland encompasses many industries that are considered large employers of low-skilled labor. These industries include agriculture, restaurants, hotels, and other service industries. The combination of a relatively uncompetitive environment and a large supply of low-skilled workers may be important in explaining the recent performance of the Swiss economy.
Quality of Data
Recent work by Abrahamsen, Aeppli, Atukeren, Graff, Müller, and Schips (2003) argue that our finding that Switzerland has gone though a great depression is partially the result of the poor quality of Swiss data and that, given this problem with the data, it is difficult or impossible to compare Swiss economic performance with that of other countries, like the United States. To start with, Abrahamsen et al. (2003) ignore Swiss data for the period before 1980 presumably because they feel that these data are so bad that they have to be discarded completely. 7 Notice that, in Figure 6 , the period 1973-1980 was the period of the sharpest drop in GDP per working-age person in Switzerland. Because their definition of depression would rule out periods in which drops in output are driven by massive increases in unemployment, it would probably be best for them to use another term. Abrahamsen et al. (2003) also look for evidence of depressions using a measure much more closely related to ours. They choose to run a regression with cross-country fixed effects to study the determinants of New Zealand's and Switzerland's growth. In particular, they estimate equations of the form
where g is the growth rate function, Y is output, A is TFP, K is capital, H is human capital, and L is labor for country i in year t . The country dummy, i β , captures any country-specific, time-invariant growth rate differences. The authors choose the following to serve as a proxy for TFP growth:
log log
where T is a measure of the stock of knowledge relevant for improving TFP and
is the development gap to the frontier country. is worth stressing that this point of view is drastically at odds with that taken in this paper. Our point of view is that, while individuals differ in their tastes, people are the same on average, and the institutions that these people face lead to different outcomes.
For example, the French devote about 30 percent less time to market activities than do Americans. Does this mean they derive more utility from leisure than do their biologically identical counterparts across the Atlantic Ocean? Rather than assume away the difference in hours worked by appealing to differences in preferences, shows that almost all of this difference can be attributed to differences in the two countries' tax systems, and not to different preferences.
In this paper, we have estimated different parameters β and γ for New Zealand and Switzerland for the period [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] , which we use to analyze the economic performances of these countries over the later period 1970-2000. Our stance is that the differences in these parameters across the two countries are due to differences in institutions, like labor market policies. Differences in institutions across the two countries are relatively unimportant from the perspective of this paper: we are not trying to answer the question of why Switzerland is more prosperous than New Zealand. What is essential for us is to identify any changes in institutions that may have caused the great depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland.
Appendix A: Data Sources
The data used in this paper are available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe/ and http://www.greatdepressionsbook.com. Details on the sources of the data are provided below.
National Accounts
For both New Zealand and Switzerland, data on nominal and real GDP, gross 
Hours Worked
The data on hours worked for New Zealand 1957 -1971 , Switzerland 1954 -1973 
Trade
The data on New Zealand-United Kingdom trade are from the OECD's
International Trade by Commodity Statistics database.
Historical Data
Data on GDP for years prior to 1995 are from Maddison (1995) . GDP data for This data was spliced into the working-age population data in 1960 to create the workingage population series used in Figures 1 and 4 .
Appendix B: Robustness of Output Measures
In this appendix we consider alternative measures of the population and GDP to evaluate the robustness of these depressions, and discuss some issues in the data available.
Population Measurement
Measuring population as those aged 15-64, rather than the total population, only makes a difference in our results if there has been a change in the fraction of 15-64 year olds in the total population. We plot detrended GDP per population measure as well as GDP per working-age person in Figure B1 and Figure B2 
GDP Measurement and the Terms of Trade
Recent work by Kohli (2002) Kohli (2000) finds that the conventional GDP measure misses 13 percentage points of growth compared to his measure.
To evaluate the effects of this possible mismeasurement, we compute measures of command basis GDP per working-age person. Our command basis GDP is calculated by deflating the consumption and investment portions of the national accounts by their implicit price deflators, while we deflate net exports by the implicit price deflator for imports. Figure B3 and Figure 
